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INTRODUCTION* 
This paper sets out to examine fiscal ad-
justment in Hungary and try to identify 
a period of successful fiscal adjustment 
in the last 13 years. The intention is also 
to identify the factors that hamper or 
favour successful fiscal adjustment. Fiscal 
adjustment is an important dimension of 
structural transformation, as it captures 
changes in the incentives offered by the 
state and its redistribution policy, which 
affect both capital and the labour mar-
ket. There are also implications for short 
and medium-term economic growth. For 
EU member-states, fiscal adjustment was 
especially important in the 1990s in the 
run-up to meeting the Maastricht criteria 
for Economic and Monetary Union entry. 
Double the effort seems to have 
been required of the transition countries. 
The state had to scale down the appara-
tus supposed to provide an extensive set 
of social policies for its citizens while 
building other reliable services, and to 
secure entry to the EU with an equally 
large bureaucracy that has to be moti-
vated with appropriate incentives. More-
over, the transition economies have to 
address the social costs of transition 
through effective social policies built on 
the insurance principal. 
To this end, the paper rests on 
findings of Von Hagen et al. (2001) in 
defining fiscal consolidation and on the 
work of Alesina and Perotti (1995 and 
1997) in defining successful fiscal ad-
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justment. The paper also makes use of 
comparisons between countries resulting 
from these papers, drawing on perform-
ance in the developed countries. 
The paper uses an empirical ap-
proach to the problem of fiscal adjust-
ment, insofar as the data analysed here 
are annual budget figures. The series 
are only for 13 years, which makes it 
difficult to apply econometric techniques. 
The paper sets out to analyse each epi-
sode of fiscal adjustment and then de-
cide weather it was successful or not, 
according to definitions found in the lit-
erature. 
In following the course of the 
budget deficits in Hungary over the last 
13 years, an attempt is made first to 
find the episodes of decline in fiscal defi-
cits. The next step is to analyse the 
factors behind this decline, by looking to 
the course of the main categories in 
budget revenues and expenditures. This 
helps to shed light on the sustainability 
of such fiscal consolidations. Secondly, 
the paper looks for follow-ups to these 
budget declines in a macroeconomic 
framework, mainly by analysing the be-
haviour of the GDP growth in years fol-
lowing the decrease in the budget deficit. 
Nevertheless, the paper offers some-
thing new, for tracing the fiscal consoli-
dation performance of just one country 
allows detection of the policies that were 
unsuccessful in securing a lasting fiscal 
adjustment.1 This approach differs from 
the one taken in other papers on the 
transition countries (e.g. Purfield 2003 
and Gleich 2003), which adopt a cross 
country view, and even if they take into 
account the entire period, their findings 
describe the averages for the region, not 
one country in particular. 
On the other hand, the paper sets 
out for two reasons to discuss recent 
                                                 
1 LeLoup et al. (1998) analyses budgeting in 
Hungary since 1990 and Thuma et al. (1998) 
reviews more recent reforms in Hungarian pub-
lic-finance management, in particular the estab-
lishment of the treasury system in 1996. 
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advice prompted by the IMF (2004) and 
OECD (2004) about the necessity and 
scope of fiscal adjustment in Hungary. 
(i) These are the only materials on fiscal 
adjustment that solely address Hungary’s 
experience and give a concentrated view 
of its specific problems. (ii) Although the 
IMF encourages the view taken by the 
Hungarian government in its 2002 Pre-
accession Economic Programme, it does 
not discuss the extent to which the two 
main changes decided by the authorities 
are feasible economically and politically. 
While the IMF presents an alternative 
scenario without measures to contain or 
consolidate the fiscal deficit, it does not 
appear that the government itself has a 
contingency plan. 
All in all, the first part of the pa-
per presents the theory of fiscal adjust-
ment and describes episodes of fiscal ad-
justment in Hungary in the last 13 years. 
The second part presents the macroeco-
nomic framework of these fiscal adjust-
ment episodes and seeks factors that 
prevented success. The third part men-
tions briefly the political economy of fis-
cal adjustment in Hungary, as one of 
the factors that can largely influence its 
success. Finally, the author expresses 
some views on the measures for fiscal 
adjustment proposed by the authorities in 
2002 and on their results in 2003. 
1) HISTORY OF FISCAL ADJUST-
MENT 
The fiscal adjustment that started in the 
OECD countries in the early 1990s was 
meant to reduce ratios of debt to GDP. 
For the Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) transition countries, however, the 
concern was to reduce the fiscal deficit 
resulting from the transition process. This 
was on average adjusting revenues 
downwards and spending upwards, as 
extra social costs coincided with extra 
spending to increase efficiency. 
The literature on fiscal adjustment 
has concentrated on four themes: the 
link between fiscal adjustment and budg-
etary expenditure and revenues, the suc-
cess of fiscal adjustment and the compo-
sition of spending cuts, fiscal adjustment 
and its effect on economic growth (and 
external indebtedness), and the political 
economy of fiscal adjustment. The last 
two of these are dealt with in the next 
two sections. 
There is a broad consensus in the 
literature (Alesina and Perotti 1995 and 
1997, Buti and Sapir 1998, Buti et al. 
1997, Perotti 1998, Von Hagen et al. 
2001) that the composition of the ad-
justment matters, and that it is more 
important to restrain government spend-
ing than to increase revenues. According 
to Drummond et al. (2003), expenditure 
downsizing contributed on average about 
50 per cent to fiscal adjustment while 
increasing revenues contributed only 
some 10 per cent. 
Most EU member-states underwent 
substantial fiscal adjustment in the 
1990s, in their efforts to meet the Maas-
tricht fiscal criteria. According to EU 
Commission data, the EU economies re-
duced their fiscal balances by an aver-
age of 4.2 per cent of GDP over periods 
up to eight years. But experiences dif-
fered, some seeing steep tightening over 
short periods (Sweden, for instance, ad-
justed its overall budget balance by over 
10 percentage points in four years) and 
others similar reductions over longer pe-
riods (Greece, for instance, cut its 
budget deficit by 12 percentage points in 
eight years). 
Apart from the differences in scope 
and time span of the fiscal consolidations 
in EU member-states, there was also 
variation in the structure. Some countries 
opted from the outset to reduce gov-
ernment expenditures, while others tried 
a combination of increasing revenues 
first and then cutting expenditures (after 
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1994). Based on EU Commission data, 
Drummond et al. (2003) concludes that 
the first category covers the UK and the 
Nordic members. Sweden decreased its 
structural revenues by as much as 8.2 
percentage points of GDP in three years, 
and Denmark by 2.1 percentage points 
of GDP in 1996–7. However, Denmark 
and the UK slightly increased their struc-
tural revenues over their respective peri-
ods of expenditure-based adjustments, 
while Finland and Sweden made signifi-
cant efforts to decrease their revenues. 
Table 1 
Fiscal consolidation in EU member states 
 
Member-state Consolidation period 
Actual budget 
balance 
(% of GDP) 
Belgium 1992–6 -3.1
Denmark 1996–7 -3.7 
German 1992–7 -0.3 
Greece 1990–7 -11.9 
Spain 1992–7 -1.3 
France 1995–7 -2.6 
Ireland 1991–3 0.1 
Italy 1991–7 -8.1 
Netherlands 1991–6 -2.8 
Austria 1995–7 -2.0 
Portugal 1994–6 -2.9 
Finland 1993–7 -4.5 
Sweden 1994–7 -10.4 
United Kingdom 1994–7 -5.9 
Source: IMF, Hungary Country Report 2003, 
Selected Issues, p. 43 
 
Six member-states – France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Spain – adopted a mixed strategy of 
first increasing budget revenues and then 
cutting expenditures. The most impressive 
efforts were made by Spain and Italy, 
which made the highest overall adjust-
ment in this way. Nevertheless, the budg-
etary performance of all these countries 
worsened after 1998, particularly those 
of Germany and France, which continue 
to breach the Maastricht criteria, and of 
Greece and the Netherlands, which did 
not back their tax-reform policies with 
appropriate expenditure cuts. 
A third group of states embraced a 
strategy of simply increasing revenues to 
cut budget deficits: Belgium, Ireland, 
Austria and Portugal. Belgium, the 
champion in debt to GDP ratio, in-
creased structural revenues by 3.7 per-
centage points of GDP over four years. 
It is interesting that over 1998–2003, 
when all EU member-states faced a 
worsening of their budgetary balances, 
Portugal was the first, in 2001, to ex-
ceed the Maastricht budgetary target. 
Moreover, according to ECB (2004), Ire-
land suffered alongside other member 
states the most pronounced deterioration 
in its fiscal balance by an actual rever-
sion of the budget adjustment imple-
mented previously, due to the introduc-
tion of significant tax reforms accompa-
nied by no measures to stabilize expen-
diture. 
For the CEE countries, Purfield 
(2003) analysed empirically fiscal stabili-
zation occurring between 1992 and 
2002. He showed first that there was 
significant fiscal adjustment in the transi-
tion countries, with consolidation of the 
budgetary deficit accelerating from an 
average of 1.25 per cent of GDP per 
annum for the decade to 3.5 per cent of 
GDP in 1999 and 2000. Moreover, 
Purfield shows that this downsizing of 
the deficit was achieved mainly through 
a decline in expenditure, by an average 
of 2 percentage points of GDP per an-
num. However, the budgetary framework 
was changed to mirror the changing role 
of the state in the economy, so that poli-
cies of downsizing the state or lack of 
state capacity to collect revenues led to 
falls equivalent to 0.75 percentage points 
of GDP per annum. 
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Table 2 
Indicators of fiscal policy in the CEE 
countries, 1992–2000 
 
Annual change in (% of GDP) 
Overall deficit Total      expenditure 
Total      
revenue 
-1.2 -2.1 -0.7 
Source: Purfield 2003, p. 5. 
 
A second subject of interest is what 
categories of expenditure were the main 
contributors to the cuts in overall budget 
expenditure. Von Hagen et al. (2001) 
researched this for 65 successful budget 
consolidation episodes in a sample of 20 
OECD countries over a period of almost 
30 years.2 One conclusion is that the 
composition of the expenditure adjust-
ment matters, insofar as more emphasis 
on cutting current expenditure rather 
than investment outlays gives higher 
chances of lasting fiscal adjustment. The 
simple philosophy behind this is that in-
creasing public spending increases labour 
costs and reduces profits, and therefore 
investment. The same authors hold that 
cuts in current expenditure, the most 
effective in terms of lasting fiscal ad-
justment are those made in transfers, 
subsidies and the wage bill. The same 
findings were reached by Alesina et al. 
(2001) on a panel of OECD countries, 
demonstrating a sizeable negative effect 
on business investment of public spend-
ing, in particular its public wage com-
ponent. The rationale behind this is that 
an increase in government employment 
generates a negative wealth effect, as 
labour supply increases, but it does not 
do so enough to offset completely the 
higher government employment demand. 
                                                 
2 One definition in Von Hagen et al. (2001) de-
notes as fiscal consolidation episodes in which the 
cyclically adjusted government balance rose by at 
least 1.25 per cent of cyclically adjusted GDP in 
two consecutive years. A consolidation effort is 
deemed successful if, two years after the initial 
adjustment, the government budget balance 
stands at no less than 75 per cent of the bal-
ance in the first year of the consolidation epi-
sode. 
Hence, the fall in employment and mar-
ginal product of capital in the private 
sector is associated with an increase in 
real wages and a fall in investment. 
Purfield (2003) does not find evidence 
for the CEE transition countries on the 
effects of structure on expenditure-based 
adjustments, for want of data. 
Comparison of the literature on fis-
cal adjustment in the OECD, EU and 
transition countries leads to three conclu-
sions. (i) Adjustments of over 3 percent-
age points of GDP on average in EU 
member-states and CEE countries point to 
a similar effort at fiscal consolidation, 
but over a more limited period for most 
EU economies. (ii) Experience in both EU 
member-states and CEE countries shows 
most fiscal adjustment being gained 
through expenditure cuts. (iii) In devel-
oped economies, the primary expenditure 
contributing most to expenditure cutting 
was current expenditure, with the gov-
ernment wage bill as the preferred cate-
gory. 
In Hungary, the history of budget-
ary deficits since 19913 shows four epi-
sodes of overall general-government 
budgetary deficit contraction, in only 
three of which was there a sustainable 
fall in the overall deficit. The first oc-
curred in 1993, when the overall budget 
deficit fell from 6.6 per cent of GDP to 
5.7. This trend was reversed the follow-
ing year, when the 1994 deficit re-
bounded to 6.7 per cent of GDP. The 
overall deficit decrease in 1993 over 
1992 was not prompted by the fall in 
primary expenditure, but by the fall in 
interest payments. In fact, primary ex-
penditure rose in 1993, mainly due to 
expenditures on goods and services. But 
a positive fact was that subsidies and 
                                                 
3 For the early 1990s, it is difficult to analyse 
the cyclical evolution of the transition economies. 
The paper therefore analyses the evolution of the 
overall budget deficit. Moreover, the cyclically 
adjusted deficit is not very important for the 
present purposes. The interest is in seeing how 
changes in various categories of expendi-
ture/revenue influenced the budget deficit. 
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current transfers began to fall, by a sig-
nificant 1.8 percentage points of GDP 
between 1992 and 1993. 
Table 3 
Hungary’s macroeconomic indicators, 1991-
2003: budget deficit, GDP growth and gross 
debt 
 
 
Overall budget 
deficit 
(% of GDP) 
GDP growth 
(previous year 
=100) 
Gross debt 
(% of GDP)
1991 -3.7  74.1 
1992 -6.6  78.5 
1993 -5.7 99.4 89.5 
1994 -6.7 102.9 86.6 
1995 0.6 101.5 85.2 
1996 -2.6 101.3 71.9 
1997 -2.3 104.6 63.3 
1998 -6.5 104.9 61.5 
1999 -3.7 104.2 60.5 
2000 -3.0 105.2 55.8 
2001 -4.7 103.8 53.5 
2002 -9.4 103.5 57.1 
2003 -6.0 102.9 59.1 
Sources: GFS and IMF. 
 
The second episode of fiscal con-
solidation, in 1995, seems to represent a 
big effort to reform the budgetary 
standing, as the annual overall budget 
ended up with a surplus of 0.6 percent-
age points of GDP. This turnaround is 
the more remarkable for following a 
year with a deficit of 6.7 percentage 
points of GDP. The remarkable change 
resulted primarily from a change in poli-
tics and policy. A new government 
elected in 1994 and a new finance min-
ister, Lajos Bokros, decided to accelerate 
the economic transformation and thereby 
increase awareness of accountability in 
public spending. As a result, budgetary 
expenditures were cut significantly, from 
45.4 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 42.1 
per cent in 1995. Downward adjustment 
of revenues was achieved mainly by a 
decrease in the yield from direct taxa-
tion. The main achievement was a reduc-
tion in the cost of employment, through 
lower social-security contributions that 
produced a fall in such revenues 
amounting to 1.2 percentage points of 
GDP. Equally important were lower rates 
of tax on turnover and profits, so that 
revenues from these decreased by 0.8 
percentage points of GDP compared with 
the previous year. These two reforms 
alone accounted for two-thirds of the 
overall reduction in budgetary revenues. 
Meanwhile primary expenditure 
contracted by 13.1 per cent of GDP. 
Current expenditure contributed to this 
mainly through a cut of 2 percentage 
points in expenditure on goods and ser-
vices. Here it has to be mentioned that 
wages and salaries eased by only 0.6 
percentage points of GDP over the pre-
vious year. However, it is important to 
underline that for the next three years, 
the downward trend in the weight of 
this expenditure category continued, 
which pointed to sustainable, successful 
fiscal adjustment. 
The main contribution to fiscal con-
traction came from subsidies and trans-
fers, which lost almost 4 percentage 
points between 1994 and 1995 and an 
average of two percentage points in each 
of the next two years. Thus the weight 
of subsidies and transfers decreased 
from 29.7 per cent of GDP in 2004 to 
25.9 in 1995 and 21.5 in 1997. 
Finally, capital expenditures were 
subject to a reduction of two percentage 
points of GDP from 1994 to 1995. How-
ever, after a slight subsequent reduction 
to 3.8 per cent of GDP in 1996, they 
stabilized to at around 4.1 per cent of 
GDP. 
Another episode of overall budget-
deficit decline came in 1999, when it 
was reduced to 3.7 per cent of GDP. It 
had jumped in 1998 to 6.5 per cent of 
GDP after a surplus of 2.3 per cent in 
1997 due to an attempt to reform the 
pension system. Excluding this factor, the 
budget deficit in subsequent years in-
creased by only one percentage point 
over 1996 and 1997, when a successful 
adjustment was achieved. 
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In terms of GFS data, fiscal ad-
justment continued in 2000. The de-
crease in the budget deficit of 0.2 per-
centage points of GDP was due most 
importantly to current expenditure, 
which lost 4.1 percentage points of GDP, 
mainly through a decrease in transfers 
and subsidies accounting for 4.5 per-
centage points of GDP. Despite this 
sharp fall in current revenues, total ex-
penditures decreased by only 2.8 per-
centage points of GDP over the previous 
year. This was due to a 1.4 percentage-
point increase in capital expenditure and 
a drop in current revenues of 1.2 per-
centage points of GDP since 1997, 
mainly through a loss in non-tax reve-
nues of 0.7 percentage points of GDP. 
However, it has to be pointed that 
after 1998 Hungary implemented anti-
cyclical policies and changed its gov-
ernment statistics from GFS to an ESA95 
basis, so that subsequent analysis is pre-
sented here in ESA terms. 
The last episode of fiscal deficit 
contraction in Hungary was in 2003, 
when the overall budget deficit was re-
duced by 3.4 percentage points of GDP 
from 2002 and the deficit reached a 
record high of 9.2 per cent of GDP. 
The fiscal adjustment achieved in 2003 
was an expenditure-type adjustment, as 
total revenues decreased by 1 percent-
age point of GDP, but on the expendi-
ture side, the positive aspect was a de-
crease in total expenditure of 4.4 per-
centage points of GDP over the previous 
year. However, analysis of structure 
shows that the cut did not affect cur-
rent expenditure severely, which fell by 
0.6 percentage points of GDP. Analysis 
of the composition of the cut shows that 
expenditure on goods and services in-
creased slightly with 0.6 percentage 
points of GDP, mainly due to a rise of 
0.5 percentage points in wages expendi-
tures. On the other hand, capital ex-
penditures were down by 3.2 percentage 
points of GDP and this contributed most 
to the decrease in total expenditures. 
What can be deduced from this 
description of the various episodes of 
overall deficit contraction is that there 
was only one period of sustainable defi-
cit reduction (1995-1997). Nonetheless, it 
is important that over the entire ana-
lysed period Hungary managed to de-
crease the presence of the state in the 
economy as perceived through the level 
of primary expenditure with more than 
10 percentage points of GDP (GFS ac-
counting). However, compared with 
other countries in the panel of OECD 
member states, Hungary is still per-
ceived as having a high level of gov-
ernment presence among the middle-
income countries. 
According to published findings, the 
post-1995 budget deficit adjustment was 
successful and sustainable, changing all 
expenditure parameters conducive to an 
overall sustainable spending reduction. 
Figures for the primary deficit over the 
1994–6 period show it adjusting by over 
1.25 percentage points of GDP. This is 
consistent with the findings of Purfield 
(2003) that the cyclically adjusted gov-
ernment balance increased by more than 
1.25 per cent of cyclically adjusted GDP 
in two consecutive years (1995 and 
1996). Moreover this was an expendi-
ture-based adjustment, for total revenues 
over the 1994–6 period fell by 5.1 per-
centage points of GDP, while total ex-
penditures fell by almost 10 percentage 
points. This is again consistent with the 
findings of Purfield (2003) that over 60 
per cent of the improvement in the cy-
clically adjusted budget balance was due 
to primary expenditures. Finally, the lit-
erature suggests that a successful, sus-
tainable, expenditure-based adjustment 
rests on reducing expenditure on goods 
and services (notably wages) and on 
transfers and subsidies, but without af-
fecting capital expenditure. Here the 
success of the post-1995 adjustment was 
prolonged up to 2000 (except in 1998). 
Thus, the expenditure with goods 
and services decreased continuously since 
1995 until 2000 from 10.8 per cent of 
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GDP in 1994, to 8.3 per cent in 1995 
and then steadily up to 7.1 per cent of 
GDP in 2000. Moreover, inside this 
group of expenditure, the spending on 
wages in the public sector decreased as 
a per cent of GDP almost one percent-
age point of GDP, from 4.5 in 1994 to 
3.9 in 1995 and was stabilised around 
3.5 per cent of GDP up to 2000. In the 
same time, capital expenditure were ad-
justed downwards in 1994 from 6.1 per 
cent of GDP to 4.1 per cent of GDP and 
were kept hovering around this level up 
to 2000 when they recovered to 5 per 
cent of GDP. 
The episode in 2002–4 did not fol-
low that consistent, sustainable and suc-
cessful pattern of fiscal expenditure-
based adjustment. For one thing, the 
government presence in the economy in-
creased. Total expenditure rose by some 
4 percentage points of GDP between 
2001 and 2002 and then fell by 5 per-
centage points to the level of 2000, 
causing a 9.4 per cent deficit in 2002, 
then trimmed to 6 per cent. However, 
the new government taking office in 
2002 inherited capital expenditures hith-
erto placed outside the budget frame-
work. These made a big contribution to 
the budget deficit in 2002, as did re-
capitalization of the Hungarian Develop-
ment Bank to cover its losses. According 
to OECD (2004), almost 3 percentage 
points of the 2002 deficit came from 
these. 
The only rational course for the 
budget deficit in 2004 will be down-
wards – as confirmed by undershooting 
of the 4.5 per cent target in the first 
quarter to 3.4 per cent of GDP, due to 
better tax collection and successful eco-
nomic growth. This in turn will most 
probably bring a fiscal deficit adjust-
ment according to the standards of the 
literature. However, it remains to be 
seen if this is successful in bringing and 
sustaining an expenditure-based adjust-
ment. Total revenues between 2001 and 
2003 fell by 1.7 percentage points of 
GDP and total expenditure by 0.5 per-
centage points of GDP. 
So analysis of the expenditure does 
not point to a sustainable expenditure-
based adjustment, for the mentioned 
reasons that expenditure on goods and 
services increased by 1.8 percentage 
points of GDP between 2001 and 2003 
and this increase was found even in 
2003 over 2002. Furthermore, wages 
continue to increase as a proportion of 
GDP, even while the government strug-
gles to decrease the overall deficit. The 
same applies to transfers, which grew 
by 2 percentage points of GDP in 2002 
over 2001, were cut in 2003, but 
reached in 2003 a level higher than in 
2001 by 0.5 percentage points of GDP. 
Finally, the adjustment in the last year 
was done almost exclusively on the back 
through capital expenditure. Excluding 
the hike in 2002, capital expenditures 
were cut in 2003 below the level 
achieved (an average of 4 per cent of 
GDP) up to 2002 and were forecast to 
return to this threshold in 2004. 
To sum up, the only successful fis-
cal adjustment in Hungary was the ex-
penditure-based one in 1994–6. The 
present fiscal contraction is not an ex-
penditure-based adjustment and there 
are no aspects of it to justify classing it 
as a successful adjustment. The next 
two sections examine the impact of 
these fiscal-adjustment episodes on eco-
nomic growth and to understand to 
what extent the political economy had 
any impact on the evolution of the fiscal 
adjustments. 
2) THE MACROECONOMIC 
FRAMEWORK 
There is a substantial literature report-
ing on studies of the effect of fiscal 
policy and adjustments on macroeco-
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nomic performance, particularly eco-
nomic growth and attempts to model 
these. On a more intuitive level, large 
government, expressed in terms of total 
government expenditure, has an impact 
on economic development for at least 
three reasons. (i) Much public expendi-
ture for delivering public services seems 
to waste resources, as it could have 
been employed more effectively else-
where. According to OECD (2004), a 
large public sector accounting for about 
a fifth of total employment4 signifies 
scope for economic growth, as a large 
public sector accentuates the inefficiency 
in the economy as compared with a 
smaller one. (ii) 
Figures for Hun-
gary show that a 
large chunk of 
total expenditure 
goes into welfare 
transfers and sub-
sidies, which 
points to distortion 
in the factor mar-
ket by this policy, 
especially in the 
labour market. 
According to 
OECD (2004), 
one explanatory 
factor is housing 
benefit, which dis-
torts labour mobil-
ity. (iii) Financing 
such high levels of 
expenditure calls 
for high taxation, 
which in turn distorts especially the la-
bour market through increased labour 
costs, and so reduces international com-
petitiveness. 
The literature from OECD coun-
tries concentrates mainly on the effects 
of larger government, through taxation, 
on investment and hence on lower eco-
nomic growth. Alesina et al. (2001) 
                                                 
4 Hungary’s public sector employs about 
820,000. 
showed that there is a ‘non-Keynesian’ 
effect of fiscal adjustment. Their main 
conclusion is that in OECD countries, 
an increase in public spending raises 
labour costs, which reduces profits and 
therefore investment. The magnitude of 
this effect is significant, as an increase 
of one percentage point of GDP in 
primary expenditure is conducive to a 
decrease in investment of 0.15 percent-
age points of GDP. Perotti (2002), on 
the other hand, shows that the effects 
of fiscal policy on GDP have become 
substantially weaker over time, so that 
positive government spending multipliers 
greater than 1 tend to be an exception. 
The picture in the transition coun-
tries is mixed, according to Purfield 
(2003). On the one hand, the macro-
economic indicators tend to improve 
significantly following episodes of suc-
cessful fiscal adjustment. Indeed, results 
for the transition countries show that 
the inflation rate declined substantially 
and there were some improvements in 
the current-account balance as well. On 
the other hand, Purfield considers it dif-
ficult to attribute the rebound in growth 
to successful fiscal consolidations; there 
Figure 1
Hungary’s GDP growth rate and overall budget deficit, 1991–2003 
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is a significantly greater probability that 
it was produced by reorientation of ex-
penditures from less-productive sectors, 
as Kornai (1994) suggested. 
In Hungary, during the one recog-
nized episode of successful expenditure-
based fiscal adjustment, GDP growth 
speeded up considerably in the second 
year after the adjustment and high rates 
of about 4 per cent of GDP were main-
tained. However, compared with the year 
before the adjustment, the economic 
growth rate lost about 1 percentage 
point of its increase rate. 
In 1995, slower economic growth 
was accompanied by faster inflation (28 
per cent as compared to 18.8 in the 
previous year), while the current-account 
deficit improved from 5.6 per cent of 
GDP in 1994 to 2.54 per cent in 1995. 
The low current-account deficit was 
maintained in 1996, but increased to 4 
per cent as growth recovered in subse-
quent years. It is also interesting that the 
slower economic growth in 1995 than in 
1994 was mirrored by a decrease in 
real terms of household final consump-
tion, with around 8 per cent. This find-
ing is consistent with an adjustment of 2 
percentage points of GDP in subsidies 
and transfers. 
To sum up, fiscal adjustment in 
1995 reversed the economic growth 
trend, but as this was not manifested 
until two years later, other factors must 
have had more influence on efficient al-
location of resources at that time. In the 
present situation with fiscal adjustment, 
the preliminary macroeconomic data for 
2003 reflect a mixed picture. Economic 
growth eased by 0.6 percentage points 
and data for the first quarter of 2004 
show a stronger increase of 4.3 per 
cent. So the cuts in the fiscal deficit did 
not really influence economic growth, as 
they did not really affect the fundamen-
tals of economic growth – the capital 
and labour markets – through the costs 
of these two factors. Yet data for 2004 
show a target overshoot in the first 
quarter. Meanwhile the inflation rate is 
on a decisive downward trend and the 
fiscal adjustment will probably help a 
rapid process of disinflation, unlike the 
decisions in 2001 and 2002, which 
stoked inflation by increasing household 
consumption.5 As expected, the current-
account deficit is rising compared with 
2002 due to increased household re-
sources available for final consumption. 
So in a country like Hungary where 
margins for economic growth come from 
various sources, it is hard to gauge the 
contribution, if any, of fiscal adjustment. 
3) THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
FISCAL ADJUSTMENT 
The success of fiscal consolidation in 
1994–6 and subsequent improved eco-
nomic performance in Hungary up to 
2001 are to some extent explained by 
constant and determined pursuit of a 
programme of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion initiated as early as 1994 by the 
Ministry of Finance. This process in-
cluded transformation of the budgeting 
process (preparation, legislation, and 
execution), for instance by introducing a 
treasury system. At first glance, this 
change in the institutional design of the 
budget process, due to a transformation 
of the structure of revenue and expendi-
ture necessary in a changing economic 
and political environment, should have 
rendered the budgetary process insensi-
tive to factors of political economy (i.e. 
institutions). 
The literature suggests there is a 
strong relationship between the institu-
tional design of budget processes and 
                                                 
5 There are three reasons for the overshoot of 
the budget-deficit target in Hungary in 2002: 
doubling of the minimum wage in 2000, a 50 
per cent increase in wages in the public sector 
in 2001–3, and one-off operations (share acquisi-
tions and debt adoptions). 
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aggregate fiscal performance. Several 
empirical studies have supported the 
view that budget institutions have an im-
pact on fiscal outcomes (von Hagen 
1992; Alesina et al. 1996). The underly-
ing idea is that spending can be targeted 
to particular constituencies, whereas 
revenues are centralized and residually 
determined, so that politicians have an 
incentive to internalize the full benefit at 
only a fraction of the social costs of an 
increase in spending directed to their 
own specific constituency. Due to this 
negative externality, the individually ra-
tional strategies generate budgets that 
are sub-optimal from the perspective of 
the group. The literature suggests that 
both centralizing fiscal authority and co-
operative bargaining are conducive to 
overcoming the inefficiency and so able 
to promote fiscal discipline (von Hagen 
1996 and 1998). 
In a study on budget institutions 
and fiscal performance in CEE countries, 
Gleich (2003) demonstrates that budget 
institutions in all these countries have 
had a significant effect on the capability 
of governments to gain control over 
public finances during the transition. He 
concludes that the politically more sensi-
tive budget preparation and authoriza-
tion stages, in which most of the political 
bargaining and decision-making occurs, 
are more important in determining fiscal 
outcomes than the implementation stage. 
These findings may explain the evo-
lution of the budget deficit in Hungary 
in 2000–2002 and give a hint on 
whether the present effort at fiscal ad-
justment will succeed. The then govern-
ment in 2000 decided on a 100 per 
cent increase in the minimum wage, 
which triggered inequalities in the wage 
grid across economy, mainly felt in the 
public sector. In the following pre-
election year, the government went on to 
increase public-sector wages, promised 
substantial capital funds to local gov-
ernment, and raised transfers (mainly 
social-security benefits). The 2002 elec-
tions were won by the opposition social-
ists, who kept their promise to increase 
public-sector wages by 50 per cent. The 
effect of this in 2002 was an almost 23 
per cent increase in the government 
wage bill. 
Furthermore, new governments in 
Hungary tend to consolidate budgetary 
expenditure incurred in the election year 
by the outgoing government, which 
swells the budget deficit. The incoming 
government in 1998 consolidated the ex-
penditures of the pension reform, taking 
the deficit up to 6.5 per cent of GDP. 
Discounting such consolidation, deficit 
levels remained closer to the average for 
the period. 
The influence of politics on budget 
policy has been pronounced during the 
term of the present government, as lack 
of communication between it and the 
National Bank (under the minister of fi-
nance of the previous government) un-
dermined confidence in economic targets 
in 2003. The market then forced the Na-
tional Bank into devaluing the currency, 
as inflation rose, economic growth 
slowed and the budget deficit persisted. 
Rostowski (2003) links Hungary’s slug-
gish performance compared with Poland6 
to the political struggle between two 
blocs of parties with similar levels of 
electoral support. 
However, the authorities place these 
events against the background of the 
transition process. First came macroeco-
nomic stabilization and privatization, 
producing reallocation that financed sub-
sequent institution building. These steps 
had social costs, and the final stage was 
to address consequent inequalities of per-
sonal income. According to this argu-
ment, Hungary has been stuck in the 
last stage since 1998. This provides the 
rationale behind a policy change from 
encouraging export-led growth to stimu-
lating household consumption, especially 
                                                 
6 Rostowski shows that Hungary, during the ac-
celerated economic growth of 1998–2001, ran a 
budget deficit consistently above 4 per cent of 
GDP, whereas Poland’s was only 2 per cent. 
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through generous housing-credit subsidies 
under the last government and wage 
and revenue increases under both the 
last government and this. 
Thus fiscal policy in Hungary is 
linked with the political cycle. Since the 
government is now in mid-term, it will 
be hard for it to refrain from spending. 
It will clearly not cut public-sector 
wages or transfers, so that the adjust-
able item remains capital expenditure. 
Some capital expenditure assigned to lo-
cal government in the run-up to the last 
elections was short-term and ended in 
2003, which helped to slash capital ex-
penditure last year. 
4) CONCLUSIONS 
Hungary is committed to the 2002 Pre-
accession Programme and is working 
with the IMF on a programme condu-
cive to successful fiscal adjustment. The 
basic ideas behind this are to introduce 
three-year rolling expenditure ceilings, 
as a basis for medium-term budget 
planning and to move towards perform-
ance-based budgeting. 
The ceilings make policy more 
predictable, to allow for efficient plan-
ning and offer backing for the achieve-
ment of medium-term objectives. How-
ever, the IMF warns that this commit-
ment to ‘tie the hands’ of the govern-
ment may lead to less flexibility and 
hence less desirable policies to cope with 
unexpected developments. Moreover, 
badly set ceilings (for instance, greater 
than necessary capital expenditure) may 
delay investment projects and so hinder 
economic development. On the other 
hand, the move towards performed-
based budgeting should improve trans-
parency and so promote efficient public-
service delivery. 
The two measures may therefore 
provide an answer to the problem of 
the political–fiscal cycle, but only to the 
extent to which constituencies in Hun-
gary can decide what is the appropriate 
level of public spending and how to 
achieve it. 
 
* * * * * 
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